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UNDERWRITING TERRORISM RISK
RICHARD L. THOMAS*
Well, with the events of 9/111 the insurance industry was faced
with a daunting challenge: how to determine its response to the
emergence of catastrophic risk that we really had not ever
experienced before on this scale, primarily because if you are
going to insure windstorm or quake you generally know where
those events are going to occur. 2 We have modeled them for quite
some time to determine what their patterns and probabilities
are; however, with terrorism it was a whole new thing. We had a
preview of this back in 1993 with the World Trade Center
bombing, 3 and of course, we had the Oklahoma City incident of
domestic terrorism 4 to kind of get us thinking about this. But
the events of 9/11 gave us a whole new scale beyond anything
that we had contemplated in the past.
The first question is how do you underwrite this risk? I would
like to comment on briefly on whether terrorism risk is insurable.
What has been the impact of Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
("TRIA")5 on underwriting - the decision-making process of
. Senior Vice-President and Chief Underwriting Officer, American International
Group, Inc. These remarks are an actual transcript of the author's comments at the St.
John's Journal of Legal Commentary Symposium on Mar. 14, 2003.
1 See generally Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on
Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A01 (detailing the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 where planes were flown into targets).
2 See Andrew S. Neuwelt, Note, The Impact of September 11 on Terrorism Insurance:
Comparing Senate Bill 2600. House of Representatives Bill 3210, and the United
Kingdom's Pool Re, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473, 476 (2003) (describing insurance
industry pre-9/11 as gathering data from past experiences to "forecast future losses").
3 See Christine Dugas, Attacks May Set Record for Insurers, USA TODAY, Sept. 12,
2001, at 4B (reporting that the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 resulted in $510
million in losses for the insurance industry).
4 See generally Jeanne Cummings, Ex-FEMA Official Plays New Role: Disaster
Consultant, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2001, at A12 (noting that risks of further terrorist
attacks have proven difficult to anticipate despite the act of terrorism in Oklahoma City
and the planning that followed it).
5 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2003).
497
498 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:2
taking risk? What are the key lines of business that we believe
are most susceptible to terrorist loss? Lastly, a couple of
comments on risk management in terms of what can be done to
help to reduce or mitigate the risk of terrorism.
Can we actually insure terrorism? I think if you do the
mathematics you can quickly determine that loss arising from
the detonation of a nuclear weapon is not insurable. 6 If we take a
look at the work that is being done by a number of the modeling
companies that are assisting us in this work, a nuclear weapon
detonated in Manhattan could produce a loss somewhere
between six hundred billion and $1.6 trillion dollars. 7 The
property casualty insurance industry and the commercial
property casualty insurance industry in the U.S. have about $125
billion dollars in capital.S Now, the critical thing to understand is
that the insured loss arising out of 9/11 has been paid by
insurance companies out of capital, not reserves. 9 The way
accounting for both insurance accounting and tax accounting in
this country is structured, we are not permitted to hold reserves
for future catastrophic events. 10 Essentially, the thirty to forty
billion dollars, which will be the ultimate insured loss arising out
of the events of 9/11 will be paid for out of insurance company
6 See Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism & Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 449 (2003) (stating that losses from terrorist
attacks involving nuclear weapons will probably continue to be uninsurable).
7 See, e.g., Robert P. Hartwig, September 11: One Year Later; Perspective, RISK & INS.,
Sept. 2, 2002, at 40 (quoting Warren Buffet's comment that had a nuclear weapon been
used in the terrorist attacks on 9/11 "insured losses could have been $1 trillion, an
amount that exceeds the net worth of all property-casualty insurers worldwide").
8 See generally M. R. Greenberg, Editorial, Government Must Be Insurer of Last
Resort, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2001, at A18 (reporting that the "commercial property-
casualty industry has between $100 billion and $125 billion in aggregate capital, before
payment of Sept. 11 losses").
9 See generally Gron , supra note 6, at 448 (implying that insurance companies dipped
into their capital to pay for the losses associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
10 See Tom Miller, New Protection Against Natural Disaster Losses, Competitive
Enterprise Institute, at http://www.cei.org/gencon/005,01629.cfm (June 1, 1999) (stating
that "[i]nsurance companies only are allowed to set aside funds as reserves for losses that
already have occurred").
2004] UNDERWRIING TERRORISMRISK
capital," and the total amount of capital available is roughly
$125 billion.12
Once you start modeling some of the potential loss scenarios,
and if you see numbers start to get up into the hundreds of
billions of dollars, those events are no longer insurable.13 That is
really why the whole concept of TRIA was advanced and
ultimately passed.14
Other terrorism risks include blowing up buildings, truck
bombs, chemical and biological events, and radiological events. 15
We believe that these events are insurable,16 but not within the
traditional context. Normally when we produce a product we
take risk and then ask our actuaries to study the historic losses,
to trend them forward and forecast what loss probability will be
going forward.17 We take a historic base and we project it into
the future, and that's how we determine our pricing.
11 See Patrick Chisholm, The Insurance Industry Storm, at
http://www.policycomm.com/articles/storm.htm (June 10, 2002) (quoting T.J. Crowley, the
Vice President of the Insurance Information Institute) (noting "[tihe World Trade Center
attack... will probably mean somewhere between a loss of between 40 and 50 billion
dollars. And so obviously, that has taken up pretty substantial bite of available capital in
the property-casualty insurance industry")."'
12 See generally Statement of the American Council of Life Insurers before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
the House Committee on Financial Services on the Effects of Terrorism on the Insurance
Markets, available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/102401ac.pdf
(Oct. 24, 2001) (discussing how the property/casualty industry has been the focus of
efforts to develop a private sector/government partnership to underwrite the risks
associated with expanded terrorist losses and how this would be appropriate since the
property/casualty industry has had to absorb a greater impact on its available capital
reserves).
13 See generally Federal Reinsurance for Disasters, Congressional Budget Office,
(Sept. 2002) available at http://www.actuaries.asn.au/PublicSite/pdf/horizonpaper030827
cbo.pdf (noting that "a shortage of risk-bearing capital leads to an inadequate supply of
insurance, which keeps prices steep relatively to projected losses for low-probability, high
loss events").
14 See generally id. at 30, available at http://www.actuaries.asn.au/PublicSite/pdfl
horizonpaper03O827cbo.pdf (explaining that the government should act as a residual
provider of reinsurance for so-called mega-catastrophes in order to aid insurers in the
burden of holding huge amounts of capital).
15 See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001) available at http://www.bartleby.
com/65/te/terroris.html (defining terrorism activities).
16 See generally Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against Terror, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2518
(2003) (noting that "insurers currently lack the tools to determine what the baseline of the
probabilistic risk of terrorist attacks should be," and therefore, "the potential for
misestimation for terrorism insurance may expose insurers to higher risks than other
forms of insurance").
17 See id. at 2515 (citing Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL
J. ECON. & MANAGERIAL SCI. 335, 103-05 (1974)) (discussing how insurance companies
use the estimated probability of an insured risk's occurrence and the economic cost of the
500 ST. JOHNS JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:2
For terrorism, at least foreign-inspired terrorism, we have only
had two events: the 1993 World Trade Center bombingl8 and the
events of 9/11.19 This is a totally insufficient number of data
points to be able to do any of the traditional actuarial work to
forecast what future costs might be.20 Hence, TRIA was
enacted. 21
The insurance industry did not really get what it asked for, but
it did get something that is very meaningful to its ability to
function in the current marketplace. I would like to just quickly
look at what TRIA's objectives were, and then we'll talk about
whether or not those objectives are being met.
TRIA was designed to insure widespread availability and
affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism
risk.22 It was also designed to allow private markets the time to
stabilize, to absorb the losses from 9/11 and to build capacity to
absorb future loss. 23 The objectives that have been met are
obviously that coverage is now available to every commercial
policyholder who wishes to purchase it because we are obligated
to offer that coverage. 24 The question of affordability is a subject
of great debate and probably has always been in the insurance
losses if the insured risk occurs to calculate measurement costs and in turn use these
measurement costs to calculate insurance premiums).
18 See Recent Trends in Domestic and International Terrorism, Center for Nat'l
Security Studies (April 26, 1995) available at http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/cnss.tre
nds.html (discussing that one of the two international terrorists incidents in the United
States that was highly notorious and destructive was the World Trade Center Bombing in
February 1993).
19 See generally Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al
(reporting that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were terrorist operations of
unprecedented proportion where four hijacked commercial jetliners were crashed
resulting in the deaths of 3,040 people).
20 See generally Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese M. Vaughan, FUNDAMENTALS OF
RISK AND INSURANCE, at 122-26 (8th ed. 1999) (describing that the insurance rate-making
process involves actuaries' use of data in the form of accumulated statistics on past losses
to make predictions).
21 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 41250, 41251 (Jul. 11, 2003)
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act was
signed into law in November 2002).
22 See id. at 41251 (outlining the objectives of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act).
23 See id .at 41251 (stating the purpose of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act is to
address market disruptions resulting from acts of terrorism and to allow for a transition
period during which the private insurance market can stabilize and build capacity while
preserving state insurance regulation and consumer protections).
24 See id. at 41251 (noting that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act requires insurers to
include terrorism coverage as a component of commercial property and casualty policies).
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marketplace, and will always be. 25 We have seen wild ranges in
pricing and again, it goes back to the inability to use traditional
methods to determine price. 26 There are however a number of
competing philosophies. If we thought that only those businesses
that were really targets would buy, we would have to charge
them a lot more money. 27 Insurance is a concept of spreading risk
out over broad populations. 28 Therefore, some companies have
adopted the philosophy that we want to sell full coverage to every
one of our customers. Therefore, we have set our pricing
accordingly. We have tried to design our pricing scheme so that
we keep the prices as modest as we possibly can, with only a few
exceptions. If you are the owner of the Sears Tower it is going to
cost you a little bit more than if you own a brownstone in mid-
New York. But we have done it that way so that we can generate
sufficient revenue over time to finance our deductible.
The other objective that has been met by TRIA is it will protect
the insurance industry from insolvency due to macro catastrophic
events.29 The caveat here is it may not protect individual
companies from insolvency from such events. 30
Shortfalls - the things that TRIA has not done. In talking with
members of Congress and their staff it was clearly intended that
TRIA would return the insurance industry to a pre-September
25 See generally Robert P. Hartwig & Claire Wilkinson, Terrorism Insurance, INS.
ISSUES SERIES, Aug. 2003, at 6-7, available at http://server.iii.org/yy-obj-data/binary/743
343_1_0ferrorism.pdf (last accessed Oct. 26, 2003) (noting that even with financial
support provided by the federal government as part of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,
the insurance industry faces the potential for substantial terrorism losses).
26 See generally id. at 9 (discussing the predictive models introduced into the market
to assist insurers in quantifying potential losses from future terrorism scenarios).
27 See generally id. at 8 (noting that many businesses are either retaining terrorism
risk themselves and declining terrorism coverage being offered by insurers because they
do not consider themselves terrorist targets and the cost of terrorism coverage is too
high).
28 See generally Gron, supra note 6, at 456 (explaining that because many insurers
"have more exposure relative to their capital than they would like" and are seeking to
shed such coverage until they can manage the risk better)."'
29 See generally Meg Green, A Glass Half Full: As The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
Approaches Its First Anniversary, Demand For Terrorism Insurance Is Low, But Industry
Experts Say The Backstop Is Bringing Capacity And Stability To The Marketplace, BESTS
REV., Sept. 1, 2003, at 50 (providing the example that the 'TRIA has had a psychological
impact on the insurance market in New York.... it seems to have created a comfort
level.").-,
30 See generally Alison R. Orlans, Anti-Terrorism Banking Issues: Terrorism
Insurance and Commercial Real Estate: The New Frontier, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 93, 110
(2003) (stating that federal governments intervention is justified by risk of a portion of
the industry becoming insolvent and not by risk of one insurance company becoming
insolvent).
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11th condition.31 That has not occurred and principally it has not
occurred because TRIA does not provide any protection for the
reinsurance marketplace.32 A great deal of the behavior of
insurance companies that we have seen post-9/11 has been
driven by the reinsurance marketplace. 33
If you take a look at AIG, our property-casualty loss arising out
of the events of 9/11 is roughly $1.8 billion dollars. 34 Our net loss
after reinsurance recovery is approximately six hundred million
dollars.35 So our reinsurers are paying $1.2 billion dollars of our
loss 36 and that's about the right proportion for virtually all of the
loss that arose out of 9/11. Today, if we had another event of that
scale, we would not have any recoveries from our commercial
reinsurers. 37 We have no reinsurance today that covers terrorism
as defined by TRIA.38 Therefore, it is a huge change in the
dynamic of the marketplace.
A company of our size views reinsurance very differently than
a company of a much smaller size. Greater New York Mutual, a
terrific company here operating essentially in the five boroughs,
was a major player in the property insurance market for small to
31 See Green, supra note 29, at 50 (noting that although 'TRIA has brought stability
to the marketplace, it has also raised some unanswered questions. "We were all hoping
TRIA would be the magic pill that would solve everything overnight, and that hasn't
happened...").
32 See id. at 50 (explaining TRIA's limits in that not all companies are completely risk
free from insolvency under TRIA should another terrorist attack occur).
33 See Terrorism; Tackling a Burning Issue, REINSURANCE MAG., Aug. 11, 2003, at 36
(noting that coverage remains low because of low demand and high costs despite
reinsurers now offering coverage both under TRIA and for certain other risks).
34 See id. (stating "After the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre,
reinsurance for terrorism essentially disappeared "Reinsurers absorbed the bulk of the
estimated $40bn in losses from the attack and, worried that another attack could threaten
their solvency, most simply stopped covering terrorism."').
35 See generally Cynthia Beisiegel, September 111h Revisited: The Future of The
Industry, INS. J. (Sept. 2, 2002), available at http://www.insurancejournal.comlmagazines/
west/2002/09/02/coverstory/23046.htm (discussing estimated losses of several major
insurers).
36 See generally id. (discussing impact of losses on reinsurers).
37 See generally, Press Release, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Calls for
Congressional Help to Avoid Insurance Fallout from Possible Future Terror Attacks (Oct.
25, 2001), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2001/october/01-
175a.htm (asking for Congress to take steps to avoid future insurance risks from future
terrorist attacks).
38 See generally Offer of Coverage, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, at
http://www.thehartford.comlagentsbrokers/files/C-211.doc (last visited Nov. 14, 2003)
(showing how acts of terrorism tend to be excluded from insurance policies now).
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medium-sized commercial enterprise. 39 They protected their
capital through reinsurance.40 It allowed them to offer the
capacity necessary to meet the needs of their customers. What
has happened to Greater New York Mutual? They have had to
substantially scale back the limits they could afford and the
coverage they offer because the reinsurance they have relied
upon to protect their capital is no longer available to them with
protection for terrorist loss. So it changes the behavior of
companies where reinsurance is not available as it was in the
past.41 As I mentioned, when you look at the deductible, the
seven percent deductible, we are now pretty sure that our
deductible for 2003 for AIG will be $1.2 billion dollars. Therefore,
if we had the loss - if 9/11 were repeated, instead of a six
hundred million dollar net loss, our loss would be $1.2 billion
plus ten percent of six hundred million.42 In addition to another
sixty million on top of that, which is substantially different than
pre-9/11.
Just to mention a couple of the other shortfalls of TRIA. It
does not address the question of third party liability.43 The great
uncertainty with regards to the events of the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and 9/11 is will we see successful third party
liability actions against the various players. 44 If the Victims
Compensation Fund45 does not resolve itself satisfactorily in the
interests of the families of the people who lost their lives,
whether it was in the Pentagon or in the World Trade Center,
39 See generally Greater New York Insurance Companies, GNY History, at
http://www.gny.com/history.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2003) (detailing the history of GNY
and the role they play in the property insurance market).
40 See generally Timm Herdt, Insurers Want Government Assurances, VENTURA
COUNTY STAR, Dec. 6, 2001, at All (stating that "reinsurance companies sell policies to
mainline insurance companies that seek to minimize the risks they take on when writing
policies to businesses and individuals").
41 See generally Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reinsurance for Terrorism
Risks (Oct. 2001) (paper by Dan L. Crippen, Director of the Congressional Budget Office),
at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3087&sequence=O (explaining how behavior of
companies has changed following the terrorist attacks).
42 See generally Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2003)
(giving the statutory scheme for computing losses).
43 See generally Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2003)
(omitting from discussion any mention of third party liability).
44 See generally Thomas C. Homburger & Timothy J. Grant, A Real Estate Focus: A
Changing World: A Commercial Landlord's Duty to Prevent Terrorist Attacks in Post-
September 111h America, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 669, 669 (2003) (discussing possible
commercial landlord liability).
45 September lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2001).
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will we see successful third party liability actions brought, and to
what extent will those damages run?
It's interesting to note that a number of third party liability
actions were brought arising out of the bombing of the World
Trade Center in 1993.46 They were consolidated into the Federal
Court in the Southern District of New York. 47 That court has not
yet ruled on those actions. It is difficult to think about holding
the Port Authority of New York liable for building two 110 story
towers and impugning to them negligence for the events that
occurred on 9/11. But it is an issue that deserves attention, and
it really did not get that much attention in TRIA.
The other thing is that TRIA does not provide a permanent or
long-term solution. 48 I would agree with Superintendent Serio
that regarding the early days after 9/11 the rhetoric was we are
going to go after them; we are going to take this threat away
from America and solve the problem. Then, after the
Administration realized how daunting that task would be, we
settled into a much longer battle against the worldwide threat of
terrorism.49 If you look at the timing between the events in 1993
and 2001 we believe that the threat of terrorism will be with us
for a long time.
We have done a lot in recent days to severely disrupt the
ability of Al Qaeda to function. But they are very patient, they
are very dedicated, they are very motivated, and they will figure
it out and we will see them again some day, some place. It
probably will not be within the time horizon that TRIA
contemplates. Plus, if we truly are exposed to the potential of the
detonation of a nuclear device in America we will always need
some degree of federal government protection for that act 50
46 See generally Melinda L. Reynolds, Landowner Liability for Terrorist Acts, 47 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 155, 156 (1996) (estimating civil claims filed as result of bombing totaled
over $1.9 billion).
47 See generally Statement on Congressional Action On Terrorism Insurance
Legislation, Public Papers of the Presidents, Nov. 25, 2002, at 2058 (explaining terrorism
insurance legislation consolidated lawsuits in one Federal Court which allows for a "fair
and certain resolution of claims").
48 See Manns, supra note 16, at 2509 (explaining TRIA created a temporary program
which will last for three years).
49 See generally Terror Fight on G.O.P. List for Election, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at
26 (stating President Bush's reelection agenda contains "War on Terrorism" which "will
take years to win").
50 See generally Orlans, supra note 30, at 112 (commenting that federal funding is
beneficial because insurance companies would lack the capacity to pay large sums of
money due to another terrorist attack).
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because it goes well beyond the financial capability of the
insurance industry to respond.
The key lines of business affected are obviously commercial
property. There are a number of states that embedded the basic
fire policy and statute.5 1 The significance of that is that we are
covering fire; whether we exclude terrorism or not because of the
way the statutory policy coverage is mandated. 52 It just keeps
some of us up at night if we thought exclusions were going to
limit that exposure.
The second major line affected is workers compensation. We
have done some work with Equicount, another modeling
company, on a number of different scenarios. What we believe
are plausible terrorist scenarios: truck bombs, biological weapons
attack, and things of that nature. Needless to say the loss
potential is enormous. We are looking at huge numbers coming
out of those models.
Life insurance is a third line affected. Life insurers took major
hits on 9/11 and yet TRIA does not cover them.53 However, it is
under review and it may come back in at some future date.
I would also agree that Congress today has no interest in
talking to us about TRIA; they have done the job, it is over. But
some time in the next two years we are going to have to confront
the issue of extending TRIA beyond the current scheduled
expiration date.54
I do not say this to frighten you, although it keeps me awake at
night - some of the modeling that we did of a nuclear device in
New York City, depending on all the variables and conditions,
could produce a workers compensation loss between $8 billion
and $637 billion. 55 A truck bomb in the right position in Miami
51 See id. at 118 (explaining that thirty states adopted standard fire policy which
requires property insurance to cover losses resulting from direct fire damage even if
caused by terrorism).
52 See id. at 118-19 (stating that since it is predictable a fire will ensue from a
terrorist attack standard fire provision "negates the lack of terrorism insurance if loss is
sustained from fire").
53 See generally Stephen P. Watters & Joseph S. Lawder, Justice in a Changed
World: The Impact of September 11th on Tort Law and Insurance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 809, 812 (2003) (noting recovery from The Fund for affluent people was decreased
due to access to collateral sources such as life insurance).
54 See generally Manns, supra note 16, at 2523-24 (commenting that hesitant
reinsurers combined with the expiration of reinsurance treaties caused increased
terrorism exclusions and limited coverage availability).
55 See generally'"' Joseph McCafferty, Worker's Comp: End of an Error, CFO.COM
(Jan. 22, 2002) at http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,6542%7C%7CBS%7C12%7C45,00.
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could produce a loss of $178 million to $3 billion.56 Also, the
people in Des Moines, if they think they are safe, we modeled a
railroad tank car full of chlorine being detonated to spread a
chlorine cloud across the downtown sector of Des Moines and
forecast a workers compensation loss would between $3 billion
and $46 billion dollars.57
I commented a lot about risk models. They are tools. They help
the underwriter, but they do not make decisions for us. I think
ISO made a mistake in its reliance upon the AIR model, even
though the modeling work that it is done by AIR is quite good.
The mistake was that they tried to translate that into a decision-
making process. But, how you can charge a property owner in
the District of Columbia four to five times more than what you
are going to charge a property owner whose commercial
structures are adjacent to the Pentagon is beyond my logic to
understand. I think they got carried away with their modeling
and now obviously they have been put into a position where they
have had to compromise their approach.
I think we are still seeing a lot of different approaches by
different underwriters with regards to pricing. Some who do not
believe that they are exposed are not changing anything at all.
Others are trying to charge a thousand percent. Regardless, the
prices are wild and are all over the place. There has been a lot in
the press recently about commercial property owners not buying
terrorism coverage. 58 I think in part that is due to the fact that
the market is still very chaotic. 59 Normally, if you have a
property such as Rockefeller Center and its total insured value is
two billion dollars, you would go into the market and find
numerous insurance companies who would all agree to commit
html (tracking the recent rise in historically stable workers compensation insurance
premiums after 9/11, due to new guidelines that force companies to insure for terrorism).'
56 See generally id. (providing an example of possible loss as a result of a single
event).
57 See generally id. (forecasting possible workmen's compensation losses).
58 See Joseph B. Treaster, Insurance For Terrorism Still a Rarity, N.Y. TIMES, March
8, 2003, at C1 (acknowledging that although some property owners require businesses to
carry terrorism insurance many do not carry terrorism insurance because of high costs or
that they "don't feel their property is at risk").
59 See generally id. at C1 (noting the "chaotic" state of the industry where terrorism
insurance is added to some customers' policies for free while others pay up to 2000%
above their existing rates).
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their capacity to various levels of that program. 60 Prior to 9/11
that market operated in a reasonably orderly fashion. You could
anticipate that the first layer would charge you 100 points and
the second layer would charge you 85 points, and the third layer
75 points and on up through the structure.6 1 Today when you try
to buy terrorism coverage for commercial property, that nice
orderly pattern of the market does not exist.62 You can have
somebody up in the fourth or fifth layer who wants as much as
the guy down in the first layer, and it just creates a lot of chaos
because then the guy in the first layer says nobody above me can
have better terms than I get. It really puts the buyer in a very
difficult position to make an economically sound decision on
coverage.
The other thing I would like to comment on is the dynamic
nature of the threat of terrorist loss. On 9/11 we saw the attack
against symbols of America. Al Qaeda has targeted the U.S.
Government for years. 63 They are probably responsible for the
attack on the Marine barracks, 64 the U.S.S. Cole attack, 65 the
assassination of State Department officials, 66 and obviously the
Pentagon. 67 They just broadened the scope to include the World
Trade Center.68 Essentially they were attacking symbols of
60 See generally Mark Hamblett, Two Appeals, Many Results Possible In World Trade
Center Insurance Suit, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 2002 at 1 (discussing layered insurance policies
like the one originally structured for the World Trade Center).
61 See generally id. (explaining layered insurance policies).
62 See generally S&P Won't Downgrade CMBS Deals for Terrorism Insurance, BUS.
WIRE, June 10, 2002 (noting the "evolving' state of terrorism insurance).
63 See generally David Ensor, 9/11 Chief's 'Plot To Use 10 Jets, at http://www.cnn.
com/2003/US/09/23/mohammedl (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (revealing that Al Queda's
9/11 plan was originally conceived in 1996 to involve more planes and aiming for more
widespread destruction).
64 But See Niles Latham, Judge Slaps Iran in '83 Blast, N.Y. POST, May 31, 2003, at
A004 (stating that Hezbollah waged the Marine barracks attack).
65 See generally U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Apr. 30,
2003), at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19986.htm (detailing involvement
of high ranking Al Qaeda mastermind Abdul Raheem Al-Nashiri in USS Cole attack).
66 See generally Don Van Natta, Threats and Responses: Radical Islam; Exiled
Mullah Denies Claims of Terror Ties Made by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A22
(exploring suspected Al Qaeda official Abu Musab Zarqawi's link to the assassination of
United States diplomat Laurence Foley).
67 See generally Don Van Natta, A Nation Challenged: The Inquiry; Investigators Say
Evidence Points to Bin Laden Aids as Planning Attack, N.T. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at B7
(determining that the top three Al Qaeda lieutenants planned the Sept. 11 attack on the
Pentagon and the World Trade Center).
68 See id. at B7 (stating that Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center).
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America to show that they are powerful. 69 To encourage their
followers to rise up, not here in the United States, but to rise up
in other places around the world to support them. Nevertheless,
there are other dynamics to their targeting list. There are
essentially three types of targets for terrorists; 70 the symbols of
our power, 71 our economic infrastructure, 72 and our psychology of
safety and well-being.73 We believe that if it is made
continuously difficult for terrorists to hit the U.S. Government, to
hit the symbols of America, that they will shift their targeting.
There are major petrochemical complexes down in the Houston
ship canal area that would make spectacular explosions if
properly detonated, causing grievous economic harm to the U.S.
It does not take a whole lot of thought to think about shifting the
targeting. If you wanted to bring about maximum psychological
harm to the U.S; I would take 25 operatives, none of whom need
to give up their lives in this exercise. I would ask them to go to 25
different second tier U.S. cities and at two o'clock on Thursday
afternoon blow something up; anything, a gas station, a
supermarket, a town hall, or a library. It does not make any
difference. Think about the psychological impact that that would
have on this country.
There has been a lot in discussion that with all the things that
we have done to improve airport security, we can still get a news
reporter through the security queue carrying all kinds of
paraphernalia. 74 That makes great press, but the bottom line is
69 See Akel Ismail Kahera, The Twin Towers as Martyrs: A Philosophical Idea And
Some Of Its Problems, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 83, 91 (2002) (claiming the World Trade
Center had international notoriety as "one of the most potent symbols of American
prestige and economic power").
70 See generally Nicholas Berry, Targets of Terrorists, C.D.I. TERRORISM PROJECT, at
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/moretargets.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (listing targets
and social effects desired by terrorist attacks).
71 See generally id. (noting that "symbolic public monuments" are often targeted).
72 See generally Josh Meyer & Bob Drogin, Bali Blast Signals Terrorist Shift; U.S.
Officials Say Islamic Militants, No Longer Content to Attack Western 'Symbols of
Freedom,' Are Aiming at Softer Targets, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 9 (calling the
targeting of a nation's economic infrastructure "an old tactic that Islamic militants have
undertaken over the years.").
73 See Siobhan Gorman, Fear Factor, NAT. J., May 10, 2003, (labeling the nation's
homeland security system "panic-driven" and explaining terrorism's role as "psychological
warfare").
74 See Jamie Dettmer, Security Measures Leave Many Airsick, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS,
Apr. 22, 2002, at 24 (pointing out that in an undercover test of security at eight major
airports a CBS News team found that 70 percent of the time no guard opened up lead-
lined film bags that could mask a weapon or explosive).
UNDERWRITING TERRORISMRISK
even on 9/11 if you had looked at the list of the top ten weapons
of choice of any terrorist operative to take over an aircraft, a box
cutter would not have made the list. Plus, with the additional
steps that we have taken since then it is incredibly unlikely that
a commercial passenger airliner will ever be used again in a
terrorist attack. 75 Although, that only underscores the point that
we have a very imaginative, very dedicated enemy out there and
they will find other ways. The perception of security is critical.
The more they perceive us to be aware and to be taking
appropriate actions to frustrate their ability to attack, the more
innovative they will have to become. We can protect businesses
by doing the things that many corporations are doing today;
Perimeter security, access security, etc. 76
The only thing to keep in mind is that if you have a dedicated
enemy who is willing to give up their life, they can bring about
another event. That is the world that we are going to have to live
in, and that is the world that our company is going to be
underwriting in for quite some time.
75 See generally Kent C. Krause, Putting the Transportation Security Administration
in Historical Context, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 233, 243-44 (2003) (explaining the renewed
importance of airport security).
76 See generally Rina C.Y. Chung, Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy
Issues and Implications for a Post-September 11th America, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J.
442, 444 (2003) (noting the use of card scanners to enhance security).
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